Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

Joseph LeRoy Peterson and Kathryn Pedersen
Peterson v. Cumorah S. Eldredge : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Ben E. Roberts; Attorney for Defendant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Peterson v. Eldredge, No. 7768 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1639

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

:=============·=·.'!!~~:11!:.~~
~.~··-

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JOSEPH LeROY PETERSON and
KATHRYN PEDERSEN PETERSON,
Plaintiffs an.d Respondents,

Case

· No. 7768

vs.

CUMORAH S. ELDREDGE,
Defendant and Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

FILED
JAN 16 19E2
BEN E. ROBERTS

---------------------------------------~

Clerk, Supreme Court 1 Utah

Attorney for Defendant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT 0 F THE CASE ------------------------------------

5

STATE~N~ OF FACTS -----------------------------------------STATEMENT 0 F ERR0 RS --------------------------------------

ti

P<:>I~S IN~OL ~][) --------------------------------------------------·

~

8

AR<:i~MENT ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1()
PoiNT 1: That the Court erred in making Finding
No. 4 to the effect that the plaintiffs early in 1949
offered said triplex for sale and represented to the
real estate company with which the property was
listed that the said triplex property was north of
said fence for the reason that there is not one scintilla of evidence in the record to substantiate said
finding -------------------------------------------------------------------- 1()

II:

That the Court erred in making Finding
No. 5 to the effect that the plaintiffs believed that
the fence line between the house and triplex ·Corresponded with the dividing line between said properties as set forth in the legal descriptions of the
properties in the abstract of title and other instruments pertaining to said properties; that plaintiffs
relied on this belief in executing real estate contra1ct
with the defendant -------------------------------------------------- 12

PoiNT

Ill:

That the Court erred in making Finding
No. 6 that the plaintiffs executed the real estate
contract which is the subject of this action, intending to sell to the defendant the triplex with only
that property north of the fence, for the reason
that said finding is not supported by the evidence
to the degree required by the rule in cases of mutual
mistake -------------------------------------------------------------------- 1ti

PoiNT

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

IV: That the Court erred in making Finding
No. 7 that when the defendant purchased the
triplex and executed the earnest money agreement
and real estate contract she understood that she was
purchasing only the property north of the fence,
for the reason that said finding is not supported by
the evidence to the degree required by the rule in
cases of mutual mistake ------------------------------------------ 17

PoiNT

V: That the Court erred in making Conclusion of Law No. 1 that there was a mutual mistake
of fact on the part of the plaintiffs and defendant
with respect to the property described in the Uniform Real Estate Contract between them; that
both parties intended that the said contract describe
the property north of the fence separating the
triplex from the house on the north, for the reason
that the Court erred in its interpretation and application of the law as to mutual mistakes ______________ 19

PoiNT_

VI: That the Court erred in making Conclusion of Law No. 2 that, if the plaintiffs were in any
way negligent in the execution of the real estate
contract such negligence is excusable, for the reason
that the Court misinterpreted the evidence and the
law as to its application in cases of mutual mistake-- 20

PoiNT

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Page
Cram vs. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384; 186 Pacific 100 ________ 16
Deseret National Bank vs. Dinwoodey, 17 Utah; 43;
53 Pacific 21 S -------------------------------------------------------- 16
Ewing vs. Keith, 16 Utah 3 12 : 52 Pacific 4 ________________ 16
Farmville Insurance Company vs. Butler, 55 Md. 233 __ 15
French vs. Chapman, 13 Southeast 479 ----------------------- 15
George vs. Fritsch Loan and Trust Company, 69 Utah
460; 2 56 Pacific 40 0 ----------------------------------------------- 15
Goodrich vs. Lathrop, 29 Pacific 329 ---------------------------- 21
Greve vs. Taft Realty Company, 281 Pacific 645 ________ 21
Hoback vs. Kilgores, 21 Atlantic Reports 317 ____________ 14
Houser vs. Austin, 10 Pacific 37 ---------------------------------- 14
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company vs. McClelland,
6 3 Pacific 2nd 6 S7 ---------------------------------------------------- 15
Monterey Park Bank vs. West Hollywood Bank, 13
Pacific 2nd 97 6 ------------------------------------------------~------- 17
Nordfors vs. Knight, 90 Utah 114; 60 P.acifid 2nd
1115 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
UdeIavttz
. vs. Ketchen, 190 P act"fic 1029 ______________________ 14
Weight vs. Bailey, 45 Utah 584; 147 Pacific 899 ________ 16
Wherritt vs. Dunn, 48 Utah 309; 159 Pacific 534 ____ 16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

not supported by the evidence and that the Court erred
in its interpretation and application of the law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs listed for sale 2 pieces of property with
the Inland Realtors, Inc. early in 1949. The 2 pieces of
property adjoin each other north and south and measure
55 feet in width and 165 feet deep. For many years the
property was divided into 2 tracts and were owned by the
same person. On the north tract a duplex known as 372
and 374 D Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, was built many
years ago and later a 2-storied brick house facing 7th Avenue, was built on the south tract and is known as 371 7th
Avenue.
About the 6th day of April, 1935, Mrs. Anna J.
Peterson, mother of the plaintiff, Joseph LeRoy Peterson,
and her husband purchased the south tract from a man by
the name of Bennett on which the 2-storied brick house
stood, the abstract which was introduced in evidence
showed that the dimensions of the property were 55 feet
frontage on 7th Avenue and 110 feet deep. In 1938, 3
years later, Mrs. Anna J. Peterson and her husband purchased the north tract on which stood the duplex, from
Bennett, the abstract showing the dimensions of this tract
to be 55 feet wide and 64 feet deep. The elder Petersons
purchased the property for income purposes. They remodelled the duplex into a triplex and they lived in the
2-storied brick house as their home but rented part of the
property. After Mr. Peterson passed away, Mrs. Anna J.
Peterson sold the entire tract of property in 1944 to her
son, Joseph LeRoy Peterson, one of the plaintiffs in this
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action, on a Uniform Real Estate Contract. He took over
possession and also took charge of the rentals of the apartments and his mother made her home with him and his
family.
On February 2 3, 1949 both places were listed for sale
separately and advertisements were run in the newspapers.
The 2 addresses were listed but no description of the
property by meets and bounds were given. The defendant
saw the advertisements of 1 of the realtors and made an
appointment to see the triplex.
At the time the defendant inspected the property
nothing was said about the south boundary line or what
the dimensions of the lot were. There was a chicken wire
fence supported by small steel posts about 1 foot south of
a cement walk that went around the south side of the triplex to the back door. It was covered with vines of last
summer's vintage.
The defendant decided to purchase the triplex and
signed an earnest money receipt on the 5th day of March,
1949 and deposited with the real estate company the down
payment of $3,000.00. There was no description of the
property in the earnest money receipt. On March 10,
1949 the defendant had the title examined, having been
furnished with an abstract by the plaintiffs, and that was
the first time defendant had been advised of the description of the property showing that the tract was 55 feet
wide by 64 feet deep. About March 15, 1949 the contract
in question was executed describing the property as it appeared in the abstract. The defendant took possession of
the property on April 18, 1949 and moved into the place.
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There are several sharp conflicts in the testimony
given by the respective parties in regard to the south line
of the property. The defendant says the plaintiff told her
that the fence marked the south 64-foot line of her property. The. plaintiff says he does not remember that he ever
told her that the fence was the south boundary of her
property.
The defendant testified that in.the latter part of May
or June, 1949, when the Petersons came back from southern
Utah, that she asked the plaintiff if the fence line was the
south 64-foot line of her property and Peterson said, ((Yes."
She then said she asked him if he would sell her from 3 to
6 feet south of the fence, which he refused to do. Peterson
admitted such a conversation took place at about that time.
When the defendant decided that she would sell this
property or refinance it the defendant testified that she
was informed by prospective purchasers that she did not
have 64 feet of ground within the south fence line. At
that time she decided to have a survey made. The day the
stakes were set she advised Peterson that her south boundary
line was 11 feet 9 inches south of the fence. When he complained about selling his back yard the defendant offered
to sell part of it, but not all of it, back to him but no agreement was reached. However, Peterson removed the fence
when she requested him to do so. In March of 1951 action
was brought by plaintiffs to reform the contract on the
grounds of mutual mistake.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
The appellant relies upon the following errors for a
reversal of the judgment in this case:
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POINT ONE
That the Court erred in making Finding No.4 to the
effect that the plaintiffs early in 1949 offered said triplex
for sale and represented to the real estate company with
which the property was listed that the said triplex property
was north of said fence for the reason that there is not one
scintilla of evidence in the record to substantiate said
finding.
POINT TWO
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 5 to the
effect that the plaintiffs believed that the fence line between the house and triplex corresponded with the dividing
line between said properties as set forth in the legal descriptions of the properties in the abstract of title and other
instruments pertaining to said properties; that plaintiffs
relied on this belief in executing the real estate contract
with the defendant.
POINT THREE
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 6 that
the plaintiffs executed the real estate contract which is
the subject of this action, intending to sell to the defendant
the triplex with only that property north of the fence, for
the reason that said finding is not supported by the evidence to the degree required by the rule in cases of mutual
mistake.
POINT FOUR
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 7 that
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when the defendant purchased the triplex and executed
the earnest money agreement and real estate contract she
understood that she was purchasing only the property north
of the fence, for the reason that said finding is not supported by the evidence to the degree required by the rule
-in cases of mutual mistake.
POINT FIVE
That the Court erred in making Conclusion of Law
No. 1 that there was a mutual mistake of fact on the part
of the plaintiffs and defendant with respect to the property
described in the Uniform Real Estate Contract between
them; that both parties intended that the said contract
describe the property north of the fence separa~ing the
triplex from the house on the north, for the reason that
the Court erred in its interpretation and application of the
law as to mutual mistakes.

POINT SIX
That the Court erred in making Conclusion of Law
No. 2 that, if the plaintiffs were in any way negligent in
the execution of the real estate contra~ct such negligence
is excusable, for the reason that the Court misinterpreted
the evidence and the law as to its application in cases of
mutual mistake.

ARGUMENT
Point One
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 4
to the effect that the plaintiffs early in 1949 offered
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said triplex for sale and represented to the real estate
company with which the property was listed that the
said triplex property was north of said fence for the
reason that there is not one scintilla of evidence in the
record to substantiate said finding.
From the testimony of Mrs. Peterson, one of the plaintiffs, in regard to the listing of the property with the real
estate company (7 -52) (7 -53), it appears that she did not
make any statement in regard to the fence line. Jn fact,
she testified that she did not know the dimensions of the
property, that she only made a guess at it, that the real
estate agent asked her questions which she answered as best
she could and further testified that she did not know the
dimensions of the entire tract of land, including the 2 pieces
of property which were listed for sale.
-The most probative evidence of the representations
made to the Inland Realtors, Inc., appears in the listing
(plaintiffs' Exhibit ((A"), by Mrs. J. LeRoy Peterson, 1
of the plaintiffs in this action. The size of the lot is represented as 50x60, which undoubtedly referred to the width
and depth and would place the south boundary line at at
least 8 feet south of the fence. The evidence is positive that
the chicken wire fence was never mentiond as the south
boundary line of the triplex. The defendant says that it was
never mentioned to her until long after she had occupied
the property and Peterson testified that he did not recall
ever mentioning to the defendant that the chicken wire
fence was the south boundary of the triplex property. In
paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' complaint, they set out the description of the property as it appeared in the written contract for the purchase of the both pieces of property giving
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the dimensions of each tract and signed and exe-cuted by
them as well as the mother.
To say that these plaintiffs, after being fully conversant
with the transactions by which the elder Petersons obtained
the property from the Bennetts and the subsequent purchase by the plaintiffs of the property from the mother,
did not know the dimensions of the tract were 55 feet by
16 5 feet, is unbelievable.

Point Two
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 5
to the effect that the plaintiffs believed that the fence
line between the house and triplex corresponded with
the dividing line between said properties as set forth in
the legal descriptions of the properties in the abstract
of title and other instruments pertaining to said properties; that plaintiffs relied on this belief in executing the
real estate contract with the defendant.
Under this assignment we desire to call the Court's
attention to the evidence of the record as to the fence line
being the dividing line between the said properties as set
forth in the legal descriptions of the properties in the abstract of title and other instruments.
The only evidence that I can find in the record to
support the intention of the parties, is the bald statement
and self-serving declaration that plaintiff Peterson said he
intended to sell only that part of the property lying north
of the fence (T -46) and that Mrs. Peterson made the
same statement (T-47) and there is not one word of evidence that either of them ever advised Mrs. Eldredge of
their intention.
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There is no evidence in the record as to any conversation had between the grantors and the grantee at or
prior to the execution and delivery of the contract with
regard to the boundary line or with respect to the land
which the grantors intended to convey or the grantee intended to acquire. There is no evidence that defendant was
buying the land as bounded by the fence. There was no
evidence that the Petersons told her they were selling the
land as bounded by the fence. The most that can be said
of the evidence is that it shows the fence was not on the 64foot boundary line set forth in the contract and as to
whether or not there was a mutual mistake between the
parties in writing or causing to be written in the contract
an erroneous description of the property actually intended
to be conveyed, the record is silent.
As a matter of fact, the record shows that, when the
defendant first inspected the triplex with Clinton Madsen,
a real estate agent connected with the Home and Garden
Company, nothing was said in regard to the size of the lot.
When the defendant decided to purchase the property she
was presented with an earnest money receipt on the 5th
day of March, 1949 and deposited with the real estate
company the down payment of $3,000.00. There was no
description of the property in the earnest money receipt.
On March 10, 1949 the defendant had the title examined,
having been furnished with an abstract by the plaintiffs,
and that was the first time the defendant had been advised
of the description of the property showing that the tra~t
was 55 feet wide and 64 feet deep. The attorney's opinion
called attention to the fa.ct that the property was in the
name of Joseph U. Peterson and Mrs. Anna J. Peterson, the
father and mother of Joseph LeRoy Peterson, the plaintiff
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in this action. Mrs. Eldredge called the plaintiff, Joseph
LeRoy Peterson, and asked him why the property was not
in his name that he was selling to her. Peterson said that
he was buying the property from his mother and that he had
not had time to file the necessary papers showing the termination of the joint tenancy in his father, who had passed
away, and obtain a deed from his mother. He promised at
that time to have the proper instruments filed at the county
recorder's office. The property of this date still stands in
the father's and mother's name. About March 15, 1949
the contract in question was executed between the parties,
describing the property as it appeared in the abstract~ The
defendant took possession of the property on April 18,
1949 and moved into the place.
In the case of Udelavitz vs. Ketchen, 190 Pacific
1029, the Court discusses the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a reformation of a contract on the
grounds of mutual mistake: t:c:Before relief can be granted
either in an original action therefor or when relied upon
as an equitable defense, it must appear that the mistake
was mutual." and cites the following authorities:
Hoback vs. Kilgores, 21 Atlantic Reports 317
Houser vs. Austin, 1 0 Pacific 37.
Continuing its discussion, the Court says, uThe evidence must be clear and satisfactory leaving but little if
any doubt of the mistake. It must be made out by the
clearest and most satisfactory testimony such as to leave
no fair and reasonable doubt on the mind that the writing
does not correctly embody the real intention of the parties.
A mere preponderance of the evidence will not suffice and
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the burden of proof is upon the party alleging the mutual
mistake" and then cites the following authorities:
French vs. Chapman, 13 Southeast 479
Farmville Insurance Company vs. Butler, 55 Md.
233.
The question of the degree of proof required to entitle a party to a reformation of a written instrument has
been before this Court in a number of cases. The Court
has also spoken on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence to justify a reformation of a written contract. In
the case of George vs. Fritsch Loan and Trust Company,
69 Utah 460; 256 Pacific 400, the Court says: uThe law
is well settled that in this and other jurisdictions that a
written contract will be reformed to express the agreement of the parties where the proof of the mistake is clear,
definite and convincing and where the party seeking the_
reformation is not guilty of negligence in drawing the
contract nor of latches in making timely application for
the reformation."
In Nordfors vs. Knight, 90 Utah 114; 60 Pacific 2nd
111 5, the Court says: uA written contract will be reformed
to express the agreement of the parties where proof of
mistake is clear, definite and convincing and where the
party seeking relief is not guilty of negligence in the execution of the contract or of latches in making timely application for the reformation."
To the same effect in the case of Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company vs. McClelland, 63 Pacific 2nd 657,
the Court states that the evidence of the mutual mistake
must be clear and satisfactory to justify reformation of a
written instrument and the mere preponderance of the
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evidence is insufficient but such mistake need not be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Other Utah cases in which the weight and sufficiency
of the evidence has been discussed are as follows:
Ewing vs. Keith, 16 Utah 312; 52 Pacific 4
Deseret National Bank vs. Dinwoodey, 17 Utah 43;
53 Pacific 21 5
Weight vs. Bailey, 45 Utah 584; 147 Pacific 899
Cram vs. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384; 186 Pacific 100
Wherritt vs. Dunn, 48 Utah 309; 159 Pacific 534.

Point Three
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 6
that the plaintiffs executed the real estate contract which
is the subject of tl1is action, intending to sell to the defendant the triplex with only that property north of the
fence for the reason that the said finding is not supported by the evidence to the degree required by the rule
in cases of mutual mistake.
The same rule applies to this assignment of error as
set forth in the argume.nt of Point Two. The only evidence of the intention of the Petersons that appears in the
record, is the statement by Peterson (T -46) that he only
intended to convey to the defendant the property north
of the chicken wire fence and Mrs. Peterson made the same
statement (T -47) but neither ever conveyed that intention to the defendant at any time prior to the execution
and the delivery of the contract.
It is the contention of the defendant that this evidence
is neither satisfa~ctory, clear or convincing that such was
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the intention of the parties and it is the general rule that
equity will not furnish relief where the mistake arose concerning facts in reference to which the party claiming this
mistake had means of knowledge and may have ascertained
the truth in regard to the mistake in the contract.
In ·the case of Monterey Park Bank vs. West Hollywood Bank, 13 Pacific 2nd 976, the Court held that a party
cannot rely on his own negligence in failing to discover
error in the amount of property conveyed.

Point Four
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 7
that when the defendant purchased the triplex and executed the earnest money agreement and real estate contract she understood that she was purchasing only the
property north of the fence for the reason that said
finding is not supported by the evidence to the degree
required by the rule in cases of mutual mistake.
In regard to this assignment we submit that there
is no evidence that the defendant was ever told that the
chicken wire fence was the southern boundary of the property that she was to purchase. The transaction took place
in the latter part of February and the first of March in
the middle of the wintertime; the chicken wire fence was
covered with morning glory vines of the past summer;
there was nothing in the earnest money receipt which gave
any description of the property except the address and the
first time that the defendant was informed of the dimensions of the property in connection with this transaction
was when she received a 'Yritten opinion from her attorney,
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in which, among other things, she was advised that the
legal title to the property was not in the name of Joseph
LeRoy Peterson and his wife, plaintiffs in this a.ction, but
in the name of his father and mother. The defendant had
a conversation with the plaintiff, Joseph LeRoy Peterson,
asking him why the property that he was selling her was
not in his name. It is uncontradicted that he explained to
her that he was purchasing the property from his mother,
that he had not had time to file the necessary papers showing the conveyance to him and the termination of the joint
tenancy of his father who had passed away, but that he
would have it taken care of immediately. This statement
was made before the contract was ever executed by Peterson and his wife and the defendant, Mrs. Eldredge. The
attorney's opinion showed that the property was 55 feet
wide by 64 feet in depth and that was the amount of
property that she understood she would purchase and no
one had ever informed her to the contrary during the
negotiations or prior to the execution of the contract.
It is interesting to note the testimony of Mr. Peterson ( T- 39) on cross examination:

· Q. ((Did you ever tell Mrs. Eldredge that that
fence was the sop.th line of the 64 foot line?"

A. ((I can't say that I did, sir."

Q. ((So you don't know then what she believed or thought or understood then about that
fence, do you, if you did not tell her that was the
line?"
A.

ul don't know what she understood, sir."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

Q. etyou say you never told her that that was
the south line of that 64 foot lot?"
A. ul don't believe I did, sir."
The defendant, Mrs. Eldredge, testified that she was
never informed that the chicken wire fence was the south
boundary of her property until May or June of 1949 after
the Petersons came back from southern Utah. At that time
she said she asked Peterson if that was the south line of the
64 foot lot and he said, uYes," and that she wanted to know
if he would sell her from 3 to 6 feet on the south of the
fence in order to be able to have some space to. the south
of her house. Peterson refused to do so. It is apparent that
there was no participation in a mutual mistake on the part
of the defendant, Mrs. Eldredge. The Petersons owned
both pieces of property at the time that Mrs. Eldredge
purchased the north tract and certainly the fact that there
was a chicken wire fence 4 feet high covered with vines and
flowers would give any indication that it was a permanent
boundary line between these 2 tracts of property owned by
the same person.

Point Five
That the Court erred in making Conclusion of
Law No. 1 that there was a mutual mistake of fact on
the part of the plaintiffs and defendant with respect to
the property described in the Uniform Real Estate Contract between them; that both parties intended that said
contract describe the property north of the fence separating the triplex from the house on the north for the
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reason that the Court erred in its interpretation of the
applicaion of the law as to mutual mistakes.
This conclusion is based upon the evidence set out in
Finding No. 5 and Finding No. 6 and it is our contention
that it is based upon a misinterpretation and application
of the law as to mutual mistake as hereinbefore set forth.

Point Six
That the Court erred in making Conclusion of
Law No. 2 that if plaintiffs were in any way negligent
in the execution of the real estate contract such negligence is excusable for the reason that the Court misinterpreted th.e evidence and the law as to its application
in cases of mutual mistake.
Under this assignment of error it is apparent that the
Court did not take in to consideration the degree of proof
necessary to reach such a conclusion. It is the general rule
that in the absence of fraud or undue influence, a party
cannot rely upon his own negligence or carelessness to reform a written instrument. In this case there is no doubt
of the negligence of the plaintiffs. They were familiar with
the history of the transactions of this tract of land for
several years. Peterson had lived with his parents in the
home on the south tract of land before he was married and
he lived with them from July, 1935 until 1937. In 1938,
his parents bought the north tract but they had used the
property up to the duplex which they did not own for a
period of 3 years. They rehabilitated the lawn, had a garden
and grew flowers on the very property that is now in dis-
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pute. Mrs. Anna J. Peterson, the mother of the plaintiff,
testified that they had occupied this property that did not
belong to them for the reason that she knew some day
later they were going to buy it.
In the case of Greve vs. Taft Realty Company, 281
Pacific 645, the question arose as to whether the testimony
of the two officers of the realty company where they had
not read the agreement and did not intend to bind the
corporation, can be given any legal effect in an action to
reform a deed, the Court held that the great weight of
authority was against any such legal premise.
In the case of Goodrich vs. Lathrop, 29 Pacific 329,
the Court held that under a statute of rescission of instruments, it was held that rescission cannot be adjudged for a
mere mistake unless the party against whom it is adjudged
can be restored to substantially the same position as if the
contract had not been made.
The court by its decision has deprived the defendant
of 11 feet 9 inches of property south of the fence line
upon a theory of mutual mistake. We maintain that that
evidence is insufficient to substantiate such a holding and·
that there is no evidence that the defendant, Mrs. Eldredge,
was at any time advised of the intention of the plaintiffs
and that she relied entirely upon the description of the
property which the plaintiffs furnished to her in an abstract
which she had examined and understood that the dimensions of the property were 55 feet in width by 64 feet in
depth.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we submit that the evidence introduced
in this case and under the arguments and authorities herein
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presented, the judgment of the Lower Court should be
vacated and set aside and that the contract for the sale
of said property be declared in full force and effect.
Respectfully submitted,

BEN E. ROBERTS
Attorney· for the Defendant.
91 0 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

not indicate the south limits of her property.
While plaintiffs' evidence of the mutual mistake
must be clear and S>atisfactory to justify reformation of
the real estate contract, and a mere preponderance of
the evidence is not sufficient, it must be remembered
that the plaintiffs do not have the burden of proving
such mistake beyond a reasonable doubt. See M etropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. McClelland, 63 P. 2d 657.
Plaintiffs submit without lengthy recitation of the
details of the evidence and without lengthy argument,
that the record establishes the mutual mistake by evidence that is n1ost clear, definite and convincing.
POINT II. PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT IN
THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT, OR, IF THEY
WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE, THE COURT DID
NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS EXCUSABLE.

When the court concluded as a matter of law that
if the plaintiffs were in any way negligent in the execution of the real estate contract, such negligence is excusable, the court was well aware that these plaintiffs were
familiar with the house and triplex properties. It was
this very familiarity with the p·roperties that caused the
plaintiffs to act as they did.
The plaintiff Joseph LeRoy Peterson lived in the
large house on the corner from 1935 to 1937 and during
that period the plaintiff Kathryn Pedersen Peterson was
a frequent visitor in the home. This was before the
parents of plaintiff Joseph LeRoy Peterson bought the
triplex next door. During that time and until 1944 there
was a wooden fence which partially separated the house
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from the triplex. This fence was in line with the south
edge of the sidewalk which runs· along the south side of
the triplex. The back yard used with the house included
all the ground up to this sidewalk along the south side
of the triplex and up to the old wooden fence. In other
words, the yard used with the house included all the
property· now under dispute.
So both these plaintiffs came to know the back yard
of the house as they used and saw it during the period
from 1935 to 1937 and thereafter. In 1944, when plaintiffs put up the 4 ft. wire fence they did not arbitrarily
place it; rather they replaced the portion of old wooden
fence with new fence and extended the new fence across
the yard so as to separate the house and triplex con1pletely. The new fence was placed along the line dividing the two properties as they had always known it, including the period from 1935 to 1937 when the elder
Petersons owned the. large house but not the triplex.
Never at any time prior to January, 1951, had either
of the plaintiffs been given any indication or reason to
believe that the house property purchased by parents of
plaintiff Joseph LeRoy Peterson did not extend back to
the sidewalk south of the triplex and to the old wooden
fence. However, they did have reason to believe that
· the house property included all that area, and that when
the parents of Joseph LeRoy Peterson purchased the
large house they purchased all the ground up to this
sidewalk and wooden fence. Because of this, plaintiffs
concluded that the fence line and legal descriptions in
the abstracts on the house and triplex coinriderl, so far
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as the dividing line between the two properties is concerned.
When the time came for the s·ale of the triple~,
plaintiffs relied on this assumption and on their past
experience and furnished the abstract on the triplex to
the real estate company for the preparation of the uniform real estate contract. The contract was not made
up by the plaintiffs but by the real estate company which
sold the triplex to the defendant. At the· time the real
estate contract was executed, plaintiffs were living in
Blanding, Utah, and 'vere not in Slalt Lake City where
they might have made a more careful check of the physical facts. Had the plaintiffs been in Salt Lake City at
the time, they would perhaps be held to a higher degree
of care, hut being absent they were justified in relying
on their past experience and p·ermitting the description
in the abstract to be used in the preparation of the contract.
Under the circumstances, plaintiffs we~re not negligent but acted as reasonably prudent persons would
have acted when they execute·d the real estate contract,
or certainly, if they were negligent, such negligence is
excusable.
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CONCLUSION
It is clearly evident in this case that there was
a mistake of fact; that it was a mutual mistake; and that
the plaintiffs are entitled in equity to the relief they seek.
To give to the defendant the 11 ft. 9 in. strip of ground
in question would be to give her land she had no intention of acquiring when she purchased the triplex and
which the plaintiffs had no intention of selling to her,
and would do substantial hann to the plaintiffs in the
use, enjoyment and value of their home. Therefore, the
findings and decision of the lower court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

McCULLOUGH, BOYCE &
McCULLOUGH,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
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